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12 AUG 1970

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

**Confidential**

12 August 1970  
(VOL. XXI, NO. 32)

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 3 - 9 AUGUST 1970

Moscow (3310 items)

China	(5%)	7%
Indochina	(6%)	6%
Middle East	(5%)	5%
Hiroshima-Nagasaki	(--)	3%
Anniversaries		
Potsdam Anniversary	(6%)	3%
Test-Ban Treaty	(--)	2%
Anniversary		
FRG-USSR Talks	(0.1%)	1.5%
Nerve Gas	(--)	1.5%
Dumping		

Peking (2553 items)

Domestic Issues	(16%)	24%
PLA Anniversary	(23%)	16%
Indochina	(14%)	12%
[Cambodia	(8%)	9%]
South Yemen Govern-	(3%)	11%
ment Delegation		
in PRC		
Sudan Government	(--)	10%
Delegation in		
PRC		
Middle East	(13%)	8%
DPRK Military	(6%)	6%
Delegation in		
PRC		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

Western press reports detailing instances of direct U.S. air support to Cambodian ground troops prompt a flurry of Vietnamese communist comment, including articles in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 7th and in the party paper NHAN DAN on the 8th. Commentators say that this has exposed the President's "hypocrisy" in declaring in his 30 June report on the U.S. operations in Cambodia that U.S. air strikes would be continued only to interdict communist supply lines. Maintaining the fiction regarding the Vietnamese communist role in Cambodia, Hanoi says that by "communists" the United States means the "Cambodian patriotic armed forces."

Peking's NCNA briefly reports the Hanoi press commentaries, stressing direct air support and ignoring the issue of interdicting supply lines. Moscow follows Hanoi's lead in deploring the air action as a further indication of U.S. intent to pursue the war.

The first session of the Paris talks attended by Ambassador Bruce--on 6 August--was marked by the usual diatribes against U.S. "aggression" and obstruction of a peaceful settlement. The communist delegates also reviewed evidences of their "goodwill" since the bilateral talks started in May 1968 and denigrated--without detailing--the proposals advanced by the United States and Saigon.

Peking continues to publicize Sihanouk statements, and on 9 August NCNA releases his "open letter to kings, heads of state, and heads of government of nonaligned countries." Not yet available in its entirety, the letter reviews the provisions of the Cambodian constitution to prove the illegality of Sihanouk's overthrow and of his replacement with the new regime.

Peking again publicizes criticism of the USSR for its failure to recognize Sihanouk's government, in a 10 August NCNA summary of an article in a Japanese leftist monthly. Moscow for its part continues its routine-level polemic, answering Peking's charges of U.S.-Soviet collusion with countercharges of Sino-U.S. collusion.

## U.S. AIR SUPPORT FOR GOVERNMENT FORCES IN CAMBODIA ASSAILED

HANOI AND THE FRONT      Beginning on 7 August Hanoi media exploit the flurry of press reports that U.S. air strikes in Cambodia are directly supporting the Lon

Nol government troops. The initial Hanoi broadcast to South

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Vietnam--repeated on the 8th--says that despite Western press reports of direct U.S. air support for the Cambodians, the Nixon Administration continues to insist that U.S. planes "attack only the supply routes and concentrations of communist troops--that is, the Cambodian liberation troops--who might become a menace for U.S. and allied troops--that is, satellite troops in South Vietnam." The broadcast then juxtaposes reiterations by White House and Pentagon spokesmen that the air strikes are aimed at interdicting supply lines to press accounts, including AP's report of the 5 August battle near Skoun, and quotes officers on the scene as confirming that the air strikes are directly supporting the ground troops.\*

The Hanoi broadcast cites REUTERS for the report that Defense Secretary Laird at his 6 August press conference "was forced to admit" that U.S. planes support the Lon Nol "puppet troops." It goes on to say that he argued that the strikes are protecting ordinary people, and that when asked about direct support of Cambodian troops "he was embarrassed and nonsensically said that these flight missions were being carried out in accordance with the battlefield commanders' decisions." A brief reference to Laird's press conference along similar lines also appears in a 7 August Hanoi English-language broadcast.

Western press reports giving eyewitness accounts of direct U.S. air support are also reviewed in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article, broadcast in Hanoi radio's domestic service on the 7th, and in a NHAN DAN article, carried by VNA on the 8th. The army paper echoes the Hanoi broadcast earlier that day in recalling the U.S. guidelines that the air strikes are aimed at interdicting communist supplies and troops. And it also maintains the fiction regarding the Vietnamese communist role in Cambodia by inserting the editorial explanation that "communist troops" means "Cambodian patriotic armed forces." NHAN DAN, on the other hand, merely refers to "air interdiction missions" aimed at "protecting U.S. forces in South Vietnam." NHAN DAN also explicitly recalls that the guidelines had been

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\* Comment before the 30 June withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Cambodia suggested that the U.S. air strikes were aimed at "shoring up" the Lon Nol regime. In July there were more charges of air attacks and, at least once, Hanoi cited Western reports of U.S. air support for troops as refuting U.S. claims that air strikes were limited to supply routes. (See 22 July TRENDS, p. 13.)

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enunciated by President Nixon in his 30 June report on the withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from Cambodia, but the army paper does not mention the President's report.

The party paper quotes Senator Mansfield as saying that the sending of aircraft to support the Phnom Penh administration would result in an "all-sided war." And it goes on to say that the fact that "Nixon has gone back on his 30 June statement by ordering brazen bombing and strafing of the Cambodian territory once again evidences the U.S. criminal policy of aggression" against Cambodia.

Both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN insist that U.S. support cannot save the Lon Nol "clique" from defeat, but the army paper is more explicit in documenting this claim. It cites as an example of U.S. air ineffectiveness the fighting around the city of Skoun, Kompong Cham Province, where government forces allegedly still sustained high casualties and fled in spite of American air support.

Liberation Radio commentaries on the 6th and 8th commented on U.S. air action in Cambodia in routine terms, like Hanoi referring to "daily" B-52 and other air strikes and saying that this would not help the Lon Nol "puppets." Apparently the first reaction to the recent flurry of news reports and Administration spokesmen's statements about direct support comes in a commentary on the 9th entitled "Nixon's New Trick Is Exposed." It makes a passing reference to Secretary Laird's press conference on the 6th, saying that he "admitted that U.S. aircraft have bombed in support of Lon Nol troops but that this support is but indirect, and that U.S. policy toward Cambodia will not change."

PEKING On 10 August, Peking's NCNA carries accounts of the NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentaries on direct U.S. air support for the Cambodian forces. NCNA notes that the party paper cited Western press reports that large numbers of aircraft have been dispatched, and that this is another "escalation" of the war, but it ignores NHAN DAN's reference to the President's 30 June explanation that U.S. air strikes would be used for interdiction of communist supply lines. The only known Peking acknowledgment of the President's reference to interdiction came in an NCNA commentary on 3 July, but that distorted his remarks when it reported that he said "air interdiction would be continued against the Cambodian Liberation Army struggling against the rightist clique."

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Peking's only other attention to the U.S. strikes comes in an NCNA dispatch on the 11th which condemns the U.S. "escalation." This item similarly ignores the controversy between reporters and Administration spokesmen on the nature of the strikes.

MOSCOW Soviet media first note reports of direct U.S. air support for Phnom Penh troops on 4 August, when TASS cites the French CP organ L'HUMANITE as quoting a Cambodian colonel as saying that American planes had been supporting Cambodian troops for a week. The L'HUMANITE item added that this is occurring "despite the fact that President Nixon had assured the American public that the American Air Force would not provide cover to the Saigon army and the Phnom Penh troops in Cambodia." However, neither this nor subsequent items recalls the President's statement on interdiction of communist supply lines.\*

On the 5th TASS reports that White House spokesman Ziegler the day before said that American aircraft "make raids on Cambodian territory" but that U.S. policy has "remained unchanged," since on 30 June the President said that the United States would carry out "air operations" in Cambodia. TASS notes that Pentagon spokesman Friedheim said that American planes "'sometimes' help Phnom Penh and Saigon troops in their military operations," and says that this "actually confirmed" reports by American news service that U.S. planes have raided the Kirirom area for over a week. And a 6 August IZVESTIYA article says that although Washington has been trying to cover up the fact that U.S. planes continue "barbaric bombing" of Cambodia, Ziegler, confronted with "irrefutable facts," "cynically declared that there was no change of policy."

On the 7th TASS reports Secretary Laird's press conference of the previous day, asserting that he "admitted" that the United States is waging an "air war" in Cambodia, "confirming" press reports that the United States is "rendering active assistance" to the Phnom Penh troops when he said that the bombing raids are "of use" to those troops.

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\* Moscow propaganda has generally avoided reference to air interdiction in commenting on Presidential statements. Reacting to the President's 30 June report, commentators cited him as saying that "bombing raids," "air raids," or "air operations" over "Cambodian territory" would continue.

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Other reports also stress that the air operations mean an extension of the war. On the 5th TASS cites the New York POST as saying that there are all indications that the United States is conducting in Cambodia a "secret aerial war similar to that waged in Laos," and another TASS report that day cites Senator Mansfield as expressing alarm over the air support, saying that it could lead to U.S. involvement in a "new full-scale war."

### VNA SAYS AMBASSADOR BRUCE "REHASHED OLD ALLEGATIONS" AT PARIS

The VNA account treats Ambassador Bruce's debut statement at the 78th session of the Paris talks on 6 August in typical cryptic fashion, and interjects rebuttals of his remarks. Observing that Bruce "rehashed shopworn allegations of the U.S. President" and said that Nixon wanted to solve the conflict through negotiations, VNA adds that "as everybody knows, Nixon is going ahead with his policy of prolonging the war of aggression in Vietnam and expanding the war to the whole of Indochina in the hope of securing a military victory." VNA says that Bruce "claimed" the United States wants the South Vietnamese people to determine their own future, and comments that "as everybody knows," it is the United States and nobody else that has undermined the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination. After reporting that Bruce "evoked the question of 'troop withdrawal,'" VNA remarks that he did not touch on "the South Vietnamese and world peoples' demand" for an end to the U.S. "aggression" and a rapid, total, and unconditional U.S. troop withdrawal.

VNA fails to report, among other things, Bruce's urging that an effort be made to narrow the differences between the two sides' proposals, and that both sides take another look at each other's positions; neither does the account acknowledge his remark that the "central issues" are troop withdrawal, political settlement, and prisoners of war.

VNA dismisses the statement of GVN delegate Pham Dang Lam--who spoke first at the session--with the remark that he "again took up the fallacious allegation" made at the previous sessions concerning the "'re-establishment of the DMZ,' 'mutual troop withdrawal,' free elections organized by the Saigon puppets and so on."

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COMMUNIST           Both PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien and the DRV's  
SPEECHES           Nguyen Minh Vy delivered lengthy, polemical  
                    statements discussing the origins of the war,  
reviewing the various communist proposals, questioning U.S.  
sincerity, and charging U.S. escalation and spread of the war  
to all Indochina.

The PRG delegate's statement--which Liberation Radio broadcast in full on 10 August\*--recalls the NFLSV 10-point solution and its basic provisions, namely, a U.S. troop withdrawal and the establishment of a provisional coalition government. Nguyen Van Tien also recalled the PRG proposal--first advanced last December--that if the United States agrees to unconditionally withdraw its troops within six months, then the parties will discuss measures concerning the safety of the withdrawing troops. Tien added that had the United States engaged in serious negotiations and responded seriously to the 10-point solution, peace would have been restored in Vietnam, "or at least this conference would have made a long step forward."

Tien reiterated the standard charge that the United States is seeking a position of strength on the battlefield and at the conference table. And he claimed that President Nixon's eight-point program and President Thieu's political solution stand "simply boil down to schemes aimed at maintaining American neocolonialist domination over South Vietnam." He added that "they contain absurd and arrogant demands we have severely criticized and rejected many times."

The VNA report of DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy's statement notes that he explained "why" the Paris talks were stalemated and "why" the United States is prolonging the war in South Vietnam and extending it throughout all Indochina, but it does not report his detailed argumentation in this regard. In noting that Vy charged the Nixon Administration with stubbornly rejecting the DRV-PRG demands for settlement, the account fails to report his critique of the allied settlement position. Thus, it ignores his saying that since the onset of the talks, the United States has insistently maintained

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\* In the past three months Front media attention to the sessions has been confined to brief LPA summaries of the PRG statement. Prior to that Liberation Radio had usually broadcast the full text of the PRG statement the day after the session.

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its "arrogant" demand for a mutual troop withdrawal, "although termed as 'mutual withdrawal of all external forces' or 'withdrawal of all non-South Vietnamese forces.'"

VNA also omits Vy's remarks on the manifestations of goodwill of the DRV and PRG in getting the bilateral May 1968 talks started and in solving the procedural matters so that the present four-party talks got under way. VNA does report Vy's urging that the Nixon Administration change its policy and respond seriously to the NFLSV/PRG 10-point solution, but it ignores his lengthy exposition of the 10 points.

THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE Both communist delegates commented on President Nixon's 30 July press conference remarks opposing a coalition government, be it negotiated or imposed, along the lines of earlier propaganda. For example, PRG delegate Tien said the President's remarks again disclosed "more clearly his obduracy" in opposing the Vietnamese people's demands, and that his reaffirmation of the non-negotiability of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination is "simply a signboard" to avoid renouncing the GVN and engage in serious negotiations for a correct political solution.

#### MOSCOW SCORES U.S. "REJECTION" OF COALITION, BRUCE STATEMENT

Commentator Yuriy Zhukov, writing in PRAVDA on 6 August, makes the first substantial comment on President Nixon's 30 July press conference remarks on the issue of a coalition government. Zhukov cites the President's remarks that Thieu's position concerning talks "fully corresponds with ours" and that "we are against a coalition government whether it is created through talks or imposed," and goes on to note that Nixon sent Ambassador Bruce to Saigon to make sure that there would be no divergences in positions at the Paris talks.

Zhukov observes that the President's stand is harder than that taken by Secretary Rogers on 13 July when, speaking in a "completely different tone," Rogers said that "United States holds 'an extremely flexible position' and is 'ready to do everything we can in the course of the talks' to end the war. Zhukov further cites an AP commentator on 23 July as recalling that Rogers stated that the communists could have political representation in proportion to their real

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power in the country.\* Zhukov says that people in Washington are waiting with interest to see if the President will support his Secretary of State or Thieu and adds that Thieu's position is the position of the American generals in Saigon, of the Pentagon, and of the White House itself. In this connection he quotes Washington POST commentator Marder and New York TIMES commentator Smith as asserting that the press conference shows that the U.S. position has become "more rigid."\*\*

A panelist in the 9 August domestic service roundtable discussion comments similarly and briefly refers to subsequent efforts in Washington to mute the thrust of the President's remarks. The commentator says that no sooner had "one American source" mentioned the possibility of "forming a coalition government removing from the scene the odious puppet figures," than the White House denied it, the President in his press conference giving "special emphasis" to opposition to a coalition government. The commentator adds that subsequently "observers" in Washington began to assert that the President "had not intended to say this," the Washington POST asserting that Ambassador Bruce "had some new proposal to make." But he notes that Bruce himself said that his presence "will not open a new phase," but will simply be a "continuation."

BRUCE IN      Routine-level radio comment on Ambassador Bruce's  
PARIS          participation in the 6 August session of the Paris  
                talks takes him to task for offering nothing new  
in spite of the U.S. effort to portray his presence as a  
demonstration of a desire for a peace settlement. Commentators  
say that he merely restated the U.S. Government's position as it

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\* Moscow propaganda is not known to have previously acknowledged such remarks. The 15 and 16 July TASS reports of Rogers' comments upon his return from Asia, for example, reported only remarks to the effect that the end of the war was not near and that the United States was trying to get its allies to assist the Phnom Penh regime.

\*\* Moscow media have not reported the substance of a Kosygin interview with the editor of the Indian paper PATRIOT in which, according to a brief AFP report on the 10th, Kosygin criticized the United States for rejecting the "just proposal" to create a coalition government, calling this "a step back from the previous U.S. position."

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had been stated by President Nixon in his 30 July press conference--expressing unwillingness to withdraw troops, to stop all military operations, and to agree to a coalition government. A 9 August PRAVDA article says without elaboration that the session showed that not only has nothing changed but that the U.S. position has become "even more rigid and, consequently, unacceptable."

#### PEKING, MOSCOW TRADE CHARGES ON INDOCHINA POLICIES

PEKING Peking currently does not originate comment critical of Soviet policies on Indochina. But on 10 August NCNA in Chinese summarizes an article in the July issue of a leftist Japanese monthly MAO TSETUNG THOUGHT which attacks the Soviet stand with regard to U.S. aggression in Indochina and the revival of "Japanese militarism." It includes the assertion that the Soviet "revisionist" government's failure to recognize Sihanouk's government and its maintenance of diplomatic relations with the Lon Nol regime is "absurd."\* Peking has previously picked up third-party criticism of the USSR for failing to recognize the Sihanouk government; the first instance was a 10 May NCNA report of a statement by the Burmese CP. On its own authority Peking has not gone further than implicitly criticizing the Soviet Union by pointedly noting the number of regimes which recognized the government--as Mao Tse-tung did in his 20 May statement.

The article in the Japanese organ, as reported by NCNA, also attacks the USSR for having proposed through its UN representative "the convening of a new Geneva conference." It notes that this proposal was later "withdrawn," but points to Soviet-Japanese "accord" when it juxtaposes a reference to the subsequent Japanese proposal for "a new international conference" at the Djakarta conference. An

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\* Moscow's East European allies, except for Romania, have also failed to recognize the new government. On 10 August Prague's CTK reports that Cambodian sympathizers with Sihanouk occupied the Cambodian embassy in Prague and that the second secretary announced the FUNK takeover of the embassy. Hamburg's DPA on the 10th reports that CTK later "withdrew" the above report, but FBIS has monitored no such "withdrawal."

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NCNA English version of the item, carried on the 11th, omits the references to a Geneva conference and the Djakarta conference, although it does include the attack on the Soviet Union for failing to recognize Sihanouk's government.

MOSCOW Moscow's continued routine-level attacks on Peking's Indochina stand include a 7 August Mandarin-language commentary which again takes issue with the 1 August Peking joint editorial. The broadcast cites the editorial's "slanders" of the USSR for "collaboration with U.S. imperialism" as an example of "recent" statements from Peking which have "shocked and provoked concern" among those people who really cherish the interests of the Indochinese peoples. It is not necessary to refute these statements, says the commentary, since "official statements of the DRV leaders and leaders of other countries in Indochina" have highly praised Soviet aid. The commentary responds to Peking's charges by countercharging Sino-U.S. collusion, saying that Peking's attack brought "joy" to the American imperialists who have been talking about improving Sino-U.S. relations.

A Mandarin-language broadcast on the 8th does not mention Peking explicitly when it says that Soviet aid is "a fact no rumormonger can deny," and that all "genuine fighters" against oppression will understand that "any provocative statements opposing the Soviet Union will be advantageous to the imperialists."

#### ESTABLISHMENT OF SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT PRESS AGENCY ANNOUNCED

On 9 August the Cambodian Front radio cites the information bureau of the FUNK for the announcement that the News Agency of Kampuchea (AKI) will be established on the 10th as the "formal spokesman" of the FUNK and Sihanouk's government. According to the announcement, AKI will replace the information bureau in releasing news items on the struggle of the Khmer people and all documents issued by the FUNK and government. Also on the 9th, the radio carries a statement by Hu Nim, minister of information and propaganda in Sihanouk's government, that AKI will release "genuine information" to rebut the "fallacious propaganda" of the U.S. "imperialists" and the "puppet" administrations in Phnom Penh, Saigon, and Bangkok. Nothing emanating from the new press agency itself has thus far been monitored although, beginning on the 10th, VNA and Liberation Radio carry battle reports which they attribute to AKI.

Hanoi's VNA promptly carried both announcements on the 9th, and on the 10th carries a congratulatory message from the director general of VNA. Hanoi radio had been the first--on 28 July--to report the

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FUNK information bureau's announcement that the new FUNK radio would begin broadcasts on 1 August, and the chief editor of Hanoi radio had promptly sent a congratulatory message on its founding.

Peking acknowledges the news agency with an 11 August NCNA report of the initial announcement, attributed to the Front radio, and a summary of Hu Nim's statement, which is attributed to the news agency itself. There is no available Moscow report of the news agency thus far.

#### USSR REPORTS FIRYUBIN MEETING WITH SIHANOUK CABINET MINISTER

TASS on 7 August, and PRAVDA on the 8th, reports that Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin saw Thiounn Mumm, "minister of national economy and finance of the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia," during the latter's "stopover" in Moscow. There is no mention of Firyubin's earlier meeting with Thiounn Mumm on 29 June--reported by TASS and PRAVDA at the time. On 3 July AFP had reported that the minister had left Moscow for Peking, postponing a planned tour of East Europe. He subsequently attended the 18-19 July Paris world trade union conference of "solidarity with the Indochinese people," and then visited Poland and Hungary. These reports are the only instances in which Soviet media are known to have mentioned Sihanouk's government, except for the original announcement of its establishment in May.

#### ACTION IN CAMBODIA DESCRIBED, "VICTORIES" AT KIRIROM HAILED

Communist media continue to acclaim "brilliant exploits" by the Cambodian liberation forces in the Kirirom area and a detailed review of the fighting there appears in a 3 August "special communique" from the Sihanouk government's defense ministry. The communique, publicized by the FUNK radio on the 6th and by Liberation Radio and VNA on the 7th, commends cadres and combatants for overcoming difficulties in achieving success at Kirirom and notes, among other things, that in 16 days the liberation forces there "vigorously fought more than 10 battles." The "victories" at Kirirom, according to the communique, testify to the "correctness" of the policies of the Front and government led by Sihanouk.

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Achievements of the liberation forces throughout Cambodia during the month of July are recounted in a FUNK information bureau communique, summarized by VNA on the 6th and by NCNA the following day. Available battle reports on recent fighting do not mention the current engagements near Phnom Penh. Reports do note action in Kompong Cham Province--particularly around the city of Skoun--and in Kompong Thom, Kompong Speu, Takeo, Kandal, Prey Veng, and Siem Reap provinces.

#### COMMENT ON THE WAR IN THE SOUTH, U.S. STRATEGY

Recent alleged communist military achievements in South Vietnam are cited in a 1 August GIAI PHONG commentary which acclaims insurgent efforts in the first days of the rainy season. The commentary, broadcast by Liberation Radio on 4 August, claims that "exploits" at the start of the rainy season "have invalidated the U.S.-puppets' deceitful arguments about their recent imaginary victories in Cambodia, such as: 'The Viet Cong--that, is, the liberation armed forces--were driven far from the border' and that 'the adversary cannot recover his strength for six more months.'"

DRV military commentator Chien Thang (victor) in a 7 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article entitled "U.S. Strategy Is Confused," deals with U.S. failures throughout Indochina. He calls the allied Cambodian operation the "biggest political and strategic mistake of the Nixon clique" and says the "counteroffensive to nibble at and occupy the Plain of Jars in Laos" was the biggest U.S. "military setback" in Laos.

The article, broadcast by Hanoi on the 7th, begins with the claim that U.S. strategy has basically shifted from fighting rapidly for a quick solution to the strategy of fighting protractedly. It maintains routinely that "time does not work in favor of the U.S. aggressors." Ridiculing U.S. measures to carry out its strategy, the article cites the role of British expert Sir Robert Thompson as an adviser to President Nixon and derides him for "nonsensically" saying that the revolution in South Vietnam is "merely a guerrilla war" and for "mechanically" applying his Malaysian experiences to South Vietnam. Chien Thang claims that, on the contrary, in South Vietnam "there have not only been steadfast revolutionary bases and strong guerrillas but also powerful main forces" and there have been "armed struggles, political struggles, a guerrilla war, and a conventional war."

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Describing the Cambodian "attack" as "defeated" and "irrational," Chien Thang goes on to use unusually vituperative language in criticizing President Nixon. He says that "Nixon is but a mediocre strategist who has sometimes been stupid to the point that he believed that the Saigon puppet troops could be stronger than the Viet Cong and who at other times has been stupidly reckless." Maintaining that any U.S. hope for a "decisive victory" through the move into Cambodia would have required the "adversary" to be "stupid," Chien Thang concludes that "Nixon continues to erroneously assess his adversary. This proves that Nixon is more idiotic and ignorant than Johnson and that he will certainly meet heavier setbacks than Johnson did."

#### LE DUAN MEETS WITH "HIGH-RANKING" ARMY PERSONNEL

Hanoi radio and VNA on 6 August report that VWP First Secretary Le Duan "recently called on and talked to high-ranking officers" of the Vietnam People's Army, and the VNA press review on the same day notes that the meeting was prominently featured in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. Available reports do not indicate if other DRV leaders were present, but VNA does note that "standing members" of the "central commission of the party in the army" were there. The "commission" is presumably the high party organization in the army which is usually referred to as the Central Military Party Committee. Such high-level figures as Vo Nguyen Giap, Song Hao, and others have, at various times, been identified as members of the committee.

Precedent for the current meeting was set last year when, according to a 22 May 1969 Hanoi broadcast, Ho Chi Minh addressed a "recent" meeting of "high-ranking cadres of the entire army."\* Last year Hanoi reported that the meeting was also attended by Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and Giap. Truong Chinh was not appearing in public during this period in 1969.

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\* See FBIS TRENDS, 28 May 1969, pages 7-8.

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Le Duan's remarks at the current meeting are briefly summarized by VNA. But judging by the VNA report, he touched on many points raised in his lengthy 14 February article on the 40th anniversary of the North Vietnamese party. VNA says that Le Duan recalled experiences of the party in developing a correct strategic line. It notes that he stressed the party's leading role and the role of the worker-peasant alliance and that he cited the party's ability to take advantage of "enemy contradictions."

VNA reports that Le Duan "encouraged the officers to sum up their experiences from the practical as well as the critical points of view" in order to develop a Vietnamese military science. And it notes that he recommended to the officers "to see clearly the current situation and tasks," charging that the United States still "nurtures its scheme" to prolong and expand the war and quoting Ho that the war "may drag out" and the compatriots "may have to undergo new sacrifices in terms of property and human lives," but the Vietnamese people must be resolved to fight until total victory.

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## MIDDLE EAST

## MOSCOW WELCOMES CEASE-FIRE AS STEP TOWARD PEACE

TASS on 7 August in a brief triple-dated item from Cairo, London, and Washington promptly reported the respective Egyptian, Israeli, and U.S. announcements that the UAR-Israeli cease-fire would go into effect at 2200 GMT that day. Moscow's first comment comes in a domestic service report from its Cairo correspondent on the 8th which credits the agreement on the three-month cease-fire to the "UAR peace initiative," and says that the Arab world considers the "temporary" cease-fire a victory for the UAR's constructive foreign policy. Also on the 8th, TASS says the Egyptian press points out that the UAR accepted the cease-fire suggestion only "after agreement was reached" that during the three months "the enemy will not try to damage the security" of Egyptian troops on the Suez front or the positions of Arab troops on other fronts.

Moscow has given minimal attention to subsequent military action on the Jordanian and Lebanese fronts: A brief TASS item on the 10th reports from Beirut that the Israeli air force made several raids into southern Lebanon on the 9th. And Moscow's domestic service, also on the 10th, notes Beirut press reports on an Israeli raid and observes that while Israel has undertaken a three-month cease-fire in the Suez Canal zone, to judge by latest events it is not prepared to cease "aggressive activity" in other regions. TASS has carried no reports of fedayeen operations since the 7 August cease-fire; the last such brief report, as usual attributed to the joint Palestinian Command, was on 3 August. An average number of such reports--between 12 to 17 per month in the past three months--was transmitted by TASS in July.

Propaganda has noted that the Suez front remains quiet; TASS correspondent Trushin reported on the 9th that during a visit by correspondents to the front that day four Israeli planes flew over and UAR defenses fired warning shots. According to Trushin, the UAR military spokesman later told journalists that the Israeli planes were making a "reconnaissance flight" but almost entered the air defense zone. (Cairo media are the only sources for a report that Nasir on the 7th received Soviet air force commander Marshal Kutakhov, who arrived from Moscow on 1 August.)

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Soviet commentators welcome the cease-fire with cautious optimism, describing it as the "first important step" toward preparing conditions for a peaceful settlement, but warning of the obstacles ahead. Medvedko writes in the 9 August PRAVDA of "real" difficulties and "difficulties artificially created by the enemies of peace" which must be overcome before a genuine peace can be established. Lukovets in PRAVDA the same day, observing that the UAR's "peace initiative" aims at settling the crisis "by means of talks," says much effort is still required. Koryavin, in IZVESTIYA on the 10th, points out that there are still complications and obstacles to the establishment of a firm peace, but assesses the "steps already taken" as making "many things look more optimistic." An Arabic-language radio commentary by Soltan on the 10th says "the main point is that negotiations should not be allowed to turn into political maneuvers." Even now, before the start of negotiations, he says, "some in Israel" are trying to interpret the November 1967 Security Council resolution as not dealing with the liberation of all occupied territories.

An Arabic-language commentary on the 11th foresees "hard bargaining" on "regional and other questions" in view of Israeli statements regarding withdrawal and borders. A commentary by PRAVDA's Belyayev, broadcast in English to North America on the 12th, says the UAR Government feels it necessary for both sides to "declare their readiness" to carry out all points of the Security Council Resolution No. 242, particularly regarding Israeli withdrawal from "all" occupied territories; at the same time, he adds, "the foundation could and should be laid for recognition of Israel's borders as they existed before 5 June 1967."

U THANT      TASS on the 8th reports without comment U Thant's  
REPORT      7 August report to the Security Council on the  
             reactivation of the Jarring mission. The TASS  
account notes that the Secretary General's report included a letter to him from Jarring stating the agreement of the UAR, Jordan, and Israel to hold discussions "under my auspices" aimed at the establishment of peace based on mutual acknowledgment of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, and on Israeli withdrawal from "territories occupied in the 1967 conflict." TASS does not, of course, acknowledge that the language of the Jarring letter is identical to that proposed in the U.S. initiative of 19 June.

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Israel's reaction to the U Thant report is noted but not detailed by Moscow's domestic service in a report from its Cairo correspondent on 10 August. The UAR Government, the report says, has drawn the attention of the United Nations to "Tel Aviv's maneuvering" on the interpretation of the November resolution. Correspondent Rassadin adds that U Thant's report contains demands for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories, and it is "precisely this point that has aroused irritation and dissatisfaction among the Tel Aviv leaders." (Jerusalem radio on the 10th noted that the Secretary General's report omitted the conditions on which Israel based its acceptance of the U.S. initiative. Israel's reply called for withdrawal from occupied territories "to secure, recognized, and agreed boundaries.")

#### ISRAELI GOOD FAITH IN ACCEPTING U.S. INITIATIVE QUESTIONED

Moscow has glossed over Israel's 4 August official acceptance of the U.S. initiative.\* A Turkish-language commentary on the 5th, for example, notes in passing that after the UAR's agreement with the American proposals, Israel, "although making certain provisos, was forced to declare its agreement" with the U.S. initiative, and thus "some progress" has been made toward a peaceful settlement. The acceptance is also acknowledged in the course of a Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Yiddish on the 5th dealing with Prime Minister Meir's Knesset statement. Limited comment touching on the statement singles out Mrs. Meir's refusal to return to the 4 June 1967 borders and her insistence on secure frontiers, and asserts that "Israeli ruling circles" thus intend, "during the first steps leading to a settlement," to create obstacles and ultimately frustrate a solution.

In reporting the statement on the 6th, TASS fails to mention that Mrs. Meir was responding to the U.S. initiative when it cites her as saying Israel is ready to conduct talks and send a representative to discuss with the UAR and Jordan, "'with Gunnar Jarring's mediation,' questions that 'fall within the framework of the Security Council resolution.'" At the same time, TASS adds, she repeated "aggressive" Israeli claims,

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\* The text of Jordanian Foreign Minister Atallah's 26 July reply to Secretary Rogers approving the U.S. proposal, broadcast by Amman radio on 5 August, is identified by TASS in a short report the following day as an official Jordanian Government statement "in support of the peace initiative of the UAR."

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specifically declaring that Israel would not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 borders. TASS comments that "Israeli ruling circles refuse to give up their methods of blackmail and backstage maneuvers," which create difficulties for political normalization of the Middle East situation.

Mrs. Meir's remarks on borders are similarly singled out in a 6 August foreign-language commentary by Tsoppi, which asserts that the United States "compelled" the Israeli Government to "formally accept" its proposal. But Israel does not intend to revise its policy of military expansion, Tsoppi says, and even its consent to the U.S. plan, "which in fact does not set any obligations for it, was only given after receiving the U.S. assurance that it would continue to supply modern offensive weapons."

A broadcast in Arabic on the 7th sets Mrs. Meir's statement in the context of "desperate maneuvers" by Tel Aviv in the light of its "total isolation" as a result of prospects for a political settlement. The broadcast says this was the first time the word withdrawal was heard in the Knesset since June 1967, and that Mrs. Meir was "also compelled to declare" Israel's agreement to hold talks through Jarring and within the framework of Resolution 242. It too, however, believes the statements on borders signify an Israeli intention to create obstacles to a settlement.

#### USSR BUILDS UP ITS PEACE IMAGE, REJECTS JOINT BIG-TWO ROLE

While playing up the UAR's "farsighted and consistent" position and giving Cairo credit for its "peaceful initiative," Moscow at the same time takes pains to enhance its own image as a promoter of a political settlement "from the very start." But Soviet propaganda rejects any notion of a "special role by two major powers" in pursuing a peaceful solution.

Comment emphasizes that "as long ago as 1967" the Soviet Union put forward proposals aimed at a peaceful settlement, and propagandists present the adoption of Resolution 242 as resulting from the activity of the USSR and other socialist countries. A Soltan commentary broadcast in Arabic on the 10th, for example, finds it "worth mentioning" that the USSR "was one of the first countries in 1967 to submit proposals" for effecting a just peace. And Radio Peace and Progress

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broadcasts in English to Africa and in Yiddish to Israel on the 10th, also recalling Soviet proposals "back in 1967," say that the cease-fire dispells "American myths" that the Arabs plan to liquidate Israel as a state, and that the Soviet Union has "some sort of special aims" in the Middle East and is interested in preserving tension there.

A broadcast in Arabic on the 6th complains of "imperialist propaganda" attempts to "disfigure the aim of the USSR's present attitude, placing both the Soviet Union and the United States on the same level regarding the efforts made for a Middle East settlement." It argues that the two countries' attitudes toward the essence and form of a settlement are "totally contradictory," the United States pursuing imperialist aims while the Soviet Union as a socialist state opposes oppression, exploitation, violence, and expansion in international relations.

Declaring that the USSR strives to enable "the Egyptians, Syrians, Palestinians, and other people" of the Middle East "to determine their destiny by themselves," the commentary repeats the 15 July Supreme Soviet statement's formulation that the people and governments of the Middle East alone should be masters of the situation. And it recalls that in June 1967 Kosygin "refuted the statement that the two major powers" should lead the world and dictate their conditions to it. (In response to a question at his 25 June 1967 press conference at the United Nations regarding suggestions that peace in the world could be established by the two superpowers, Kosygin said that such a view, in the Soviet opinion, "is completely erroneous and certainly runs counter to our outlook, our doctrine, our philosophy. We believe that all nations, big and small, can and should participate in the discussion and solution of all world problems, in particular in the General Assembly. We can never share the view that there can be any kind of dictatorship of two states--the United States and the Soviet Union--over the world.")

A broadcast in Arabic on 9 August also recalls that Kosygin said in June 1967--this time in his 19 June address at the special session of the General Assembly--that the USSR did not recognize Israeli usurpation of territories and would work for the establishment of peace.

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U.S.-SOVIET  
PEACEKEEPING      An Arabic broadcast on 7 August contains Moscow's only monitored reaction to the idea of a joint Soviet-American peacekeeping force in the Middle East, as suggested in a 4 August Washington POST editorial. Noting the efforts of "some imperialist circles" to impose their ways of solving the Middle East problem, the commentary observes that the POST proposed a plan "to use Soviet and U.S. forces in this respect." It rejects the idea as "an attempt to drag the Soviet Union into U.S. diplomatic ways and methods which are alien" to the USSR, and asserts that the Soviet Union "resolutely denounces and condemns such ways and methods." A just Middle East settlement can be guaranteed by eliminating the causes of the conflict, it says, not by bringing in foreign forces.

#### MOSCOW RESTRAINED ON ARAB OPPOSITION TO POLITICAL SOLUTION

Propaganda touches only indirectly on militant Arab--primarily Palestinian and Iraqi--opposition to Cairo's acceptance of the U.S. initiative, portraying the UAR action as meeting with growing approval in the Arab world. Moscow gave limited attention to the 5-6 August conference in Tripoli, Libya, of foreign and defense ministers of the "frontline states," TASS on the 5th noting the presence of delegates from the UAR, Syria, Jordan, Sudan, and Libya. The main topic on the agenda, TASS added, was discussion of fulfillment of the "joint action plan against Israeli aggression" approved by the conference of heads of a number of Arab states in Tripoli 21-22 June. Iraq and Algeria, which attended the June meeting, were not present at the August conference. Assessing the results, TASS blandly cites UAR, Jordanian, and Libyan press comment to the effect that the "successful" meeting brought "full agreement on unity of action of the Arab states" against Israel.

Moscow widely publicizes the speech by Mazurov at a 5 August luncheon for a party-government delegation from dissident Iraq\*

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\* Budapest's NEPSZABADSAG in a 5 August article called Iraq's "negative attitude" on the question of a negotiated settlement "definitely harmful to the cause of peace in the Middle East." Such a stand, it said, "only adds grist to the mills of the aggressive imperialist policy, against which the progressive forces of Iraq" are waging a "long and hard war." Articles in Budapest's ESTI HIRLAP on 28 July and MAGYAR NEMZET on the 31st had similarly taken "Arab extremists" to task for refusing to act responsibly.

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in which he pledged continued Soviet aid to the Arab states and pointedly added that the Soviet Government, at the same time, "will do everything within its power to facilitate the attainment of a just political settlement." He characterized such a settlement as entailing "first of all," withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories and "satisfaction of the just rights of the Arab people of Palestine." Other propaganda also stresses these dual aims proclaimed by Cairo.

TASS on 11 August reported that Kosygin received the head of the Iraqi delegation that day and that "the discussion of questions of mutual interest passed in a friendly atmosphere." The delegation left for home on the 12th; no communique has as yet been released.

PALESTINIAN  
QUESTION

Again indicating sensitivity on the Palestinian question, Moscow in a 5 August broadcast to Arab listeners assails Peking for its opposition to a political settlement, and complains that Peking depicts the Palestinians' struggle "for their lawful rights as though it contradicted the possibility of peacefully liberating the occupied Arab territories." The commentary rhetorically asks if liberation of the lands occupied since 1967 does not serve the basic interests of the Palestinian people. And it maintains that realization of the November 1967 Security Council resolution, which provides for liberation of the occupied territories and insures the Palestinian refugees' lawful rights, "would be an important step along the path of completely solving the Palestinian question."

A Petrov article in LIFE ABROAD, signed to press 29 July, argues along the same lines in stating that Palestinian "national rights" can only be implemented within the framework of the general Arab "liberation struggle." Given the possibilities inherent in the 1967 Security Council resolution and other UN decisions, he says, Palestinian rights can undoubtedly be ultimately guaranteed "without infringing on the Israeli people's rights." In a lengthy article contrasting the "class" versus "national" approaches to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Petrov says that Arab leaders are experiencing difficulties in convincing the working masses of the correctness of a political course to a Middle East

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settlement. Considering that "not all Arab countries" agree with Cairo's decision regarding a political solution, the UAR leadership faces a difficult task in explaining its policy to the Arab public, Petrov concludes.

### PEKING EXTOLS PALESTINIAN STRUGGLE, ASSAILS "SUPERPOWERS"

Predictably, Peking fails to acknowledge Nasir's acceptance of the U.S. initiative, and ignores the UAR-Israeli cease-fire instituted on 7 August. Long a voluble exponent of Palestinian armed struggle, Peking exploits the opposition of militant Arabs to the U.S. initiative for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, at the same time obliquely attacking the Soviets for betrayal of the Arab cause. NCNA depicts the U.S. proposal as meeting with "strong condemnation and resolute opposition by the 100 million Arab people," quoting from Palestinian, Iraqi, and Syrian statements, but carefully avoids mentioning any criticism of the UAR, whose revolution anniversary on 23 July was duly saluted by Chou En-lai in "warm" greetings to Nasir. Thus NCNA on the 8th, summarizing Iraqi President al-Bakr's interview with the GUARDIAN, reports his rejection of the American proposal and his vow to continue the struggle against Zionism, but omits his charges, as published in the GUARDIAN, that Egypt is incapable of leading the Arabs or his critical comment regarding the "Nasirites."

In keeping with present Chinese policy of not attacking Moscow directly, an NCNA commentary on 30 July accused the United States and "another so-called superpower" of planning a Middle East Munich\* "in a vain attempt to force the Palestinian people and the people of the Arab countries to give up their just struggle." An NCNA commentary on 7 August described the cease-fire proposals as "a trick" designed to enable the "U.S. and Israeli aggressors to reinforce their base for aggression." It went on to assert that President Nixon had enlisted "certain people of the so-called superpower" to aid him in his Middle East "plot."

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\* Prague's RUDE PRAVO on 6 August took a swipe at the Chinese in noting that NCNA's charges that the United States and the USSR are preparing a new Munich in the Middle East closely parallel the Munich charges made by rightwing "chauvinists" in the Israeli Government.

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Also on 7 August, NCNA publicized the reply of FATAH, the organ of the leading fedayeen organization, to PRAVDA's criticism of the guerrillas' stand on the U.S. proposal. FATAH, NCNA said, had enjoined Moscow to be silent if it could not offer the fedayeen "internationalist support." Two days later, in a dispatch from Damascus, NCNA reported that FATAH had charged the Soviet Union with assuming the right to decide the fate of Palestine and with supporting decisions that were against the will of the Palestinian people. (Chou in late May had sent a warm message of support to Fatah leader Yasir Arafat, on the occasion of the Israeli incursion into Lebanon, pledging the support of the PRC people and government for the armed struggle of the Palestinian revolution.) A Palestinian "special envoy," according to the Syrian news agency on the 11th, left the previous day for a tour of the PRC, DRV, and DPRK to hold "important talks" with officials on the "present situation and the necessary measures to counter the recent plot."

Concurrently, Peking has given a warm welcome to a delegation from the hard-line People's Republic of South Yemen, and is now feting a delegation led by President an-Numayri of Sudan.

In a speech at a 7 August reception for an-Numayri, PRC Vice Chairman Tung Pi-wu, according to NCNA, warned against attempts by the United States and its "collaborator" to split the Arab countries and to stamp out revolutionary struggle in the Middle East. He confidently noted that the Arab people are "well tempered" in revolutionary struggle and added that "so long as the goal of the national liberation movement of Palestine and other Arab countries remains unrealized, the so-called Middle East question cannot possibly be settled." It is the Palestinian and other Arab peoples, he said, "and not one or two 'super-powers' who will decide the destiny of Palestine and the Arab world."

#### TIRANA SUPPORTS PALESTINIAN REJECTION OF U.S. INITIATIVE

Peking's Tirana ally has underscored its support for the Palestinian fedayeen by giving a warm reception to a Fatah delegation which visited Tirana from 30 July to 4 August.

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The leader of the group, identified by Radio Tirana as a member of the "upper central committee" of Fatah, was greeted at Tirana airport by Defense Minister Balluku and later met with Premier Shehu and party chief Hoxha.

ZERI I POPULLIT on 30 July, in an article marking the group's arrival, assailed the United States and the Soviet Union for their "plans" to "lay their hands on the riches and strategic positions of the area" and "to save the Israeli Government from political and military disaster." The article acknowledged, without comment, that the UAR and "some other Arab countries" have agreed to hold talks with Israel. It underlined, however, that Iraq, Syria, and the Palestinian Arabs have rejected the U.S. initiative, adding that "the Arab people are fully entitled to liberate by force their territories occupied by Israel through force."

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## FRG-SOVIET TREATY

## ACCORD HAILED BY MOSCOW AS "MILESTONE" FOR EUROPE

The 12 August signing in Moscow of the Soviet-West German treaty is promptly hailed by TASS commentator Orlov as a "milestone" in Europe's postwar history which will facilitate an improvement in that continent's political climate and may facilitate an improvement in the general international situation. According to Orlov, the spirit of "realism" is evident in the recognition of the inviolability of European frontiers, including the Oder-Neisse line and the frontier between the FRG and the GDR, and in the commitment of the USSR and the FRG not to solve disputes through force or the threat of force. The common point of departure in the treaty, Orlov says, is the desire to help reduce tension and to promote the development of peaceful relations for the sake of consolidating security in Europe. Orlov routinely takes note of the fact that there are "forces" in West Germany which do not approve such developments as the treaty, "but, judging by everything, such quarters enjoy ever less support."

At this writing, Soviet media have not released the text of the treaty and the accompanying letters to the USSR and the FRG's Western allies; nor are they known to have acknowledged the premature release of the documents by the Springer press.

Consistent with treatment of the negotiations with Bonn since their resumption in the Soviet capital on 27 July, Moscow devoted only a low volume of propaganda to the 7 August initialing of the FRG-Soviet treaty. TASS and Radio Moscow on the 7th promptly reported the fact of the initialing, and subsequent dispatches took note of favorable world reaction to the treaty. TASS on 9 August, for example, drawing heavily on the East European press, pointed up the importance of the agreement for the cause of European security. In the period between the initialing and the formal signing, TASS items briefly reported Brandt's arrival in Moscow for the 12 August ceremony and his activities in the Soviet capital, including his meeting with Kosygin.

Gromyko's remarks at the 7 August airport departure ceremonies for Scheel had highlighted Moscow's minimal comment on the treaty initialing. As reported by TASS, Gromyko said

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that the talks yielded results which are being "positively appraised" by both sides, and that the Soviet Government for its part is convinced that the results are in the interests of improving relations between the two countries and in the interests of further detente and security in Europe." A participant in the domestic service commentators' roundtable show on the 9th paraphrased Gromyko without attribution and took note of the favorable reaction to the accord by the world public. The commentator went on to observe that "those circles in the West" which were initially critical of the treaty "have no grounds for making any objections against the results which were extremely fruitful, necessary, and important for the cause of peace in Europe." An 11 August PRAVDA article, reviewed by TASS, concluded that "there are good reasons" for world public attention to the treaty because the questions treated in the agreement "have a great importance both for the development of relations between the Soviet Union and the FRG and for the situation in Europe as a whole."

EAST Moscow's European allies, including Romania,  
EUROPE have hailed the initialing of the accord as a step toward European security and as an augury for improved relations between the FRG and other East European states. On the latter point, an article in ZYCIE WARZAWY on the 8th, reviewed by PAP, said that the initialing of the treaty "has certainly produced a favorable climate" for other negotiations. A CTK-reviewed article in the Bratislava PRAVDA on 8 August made a similar point but went on to warn, however, that the CDU/CSU opposition in West Germany remains intent on "torpedoing" the accord before ratification. The Prague daily ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY, in an article on the 10th, observed that the treaty could become "a springboard into the future of Europe" if Bonn continues to pursue the Polish-West German talks, seeks to resolve the "open issue" with Czechoslovakia, and "expresses its positive relation" to the GDR.

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\* Soviet media have not reported the substance of a Kosygin interview with the Indian paper PATRIOT, in which, according to AFP on the 10th, he said that the treaty was a "major political event" which should serve to stabilize the situation in Europe and throughout the world.

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The first substantial East German comment in the wake of the treaty initiating appears in a 12 August NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article, transmitted textually by ADN late on the 11th. The article says that it is "good news" that the FRG-Soviet negotiations have reached a positive conclusion, and it calls the treaty a success for Soviet policy and for the socialist community as a whole. The article further characterizes the treaty as a defeat for the "rightist forces in West Germany, for all those who lack the understanding to recognize the realities" of postwar Europe. A later ADN dispatch on the 11th calls the treaty "a significant step toward detente in Europe" and hails the Brandt-Scheel government's "more realistic" approach toward European affairs.

In a related development, East German media on the 9th summarized Ulbricht's letter to the heads of state of various NATO and nonaligned countries on the need for developing relations with the GDR. According to the letter, the "fundamentally new situation" in Europe demands this. While the letter does not specify the FRG-Soviet treaty as an element in the "new situation," an East Berlin broadcast on the 10th says that the successful Bonn-Moscow talks as well as the Polish-West German talks "belong to the factors of European politics which Walter Ulbricht, in his message to various heads of state, said has led to a new situation."

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## U. S. BASES IN SPAIN

## USSR SAYS BASES AGREEMENT LINKS SPAIN TO NATO

Soviet comment on the 6 August signing of the military bases agreement between the United States and Spain stresses that the agreement links Spain more closely with the NATO defense system to the detriment of European security, fills the "breach" in the NATO front created by the French withdrawal, and provides the Pentagon with new footholds in the Mediterranean. Soviet media also point out the risks of the new agreement to the Spanish people and claim the agreement's "new obligations toward Madrid" are provoking domestic U.S. opposition to the Nixon Administration's use of the executive agreement. Commentators generally opined that the Administration rushed the signing of the agreement in order to present the Senate and the country with a fait accompli, asserting that the agreement involved "the expansion of American military commitments" and should have been referred to the Senate for ratification.

A commentator on the 9 August domestic service roundtable program declared that the agreement binds Spain "to the NATO military system by the back door." This theme was embellished by PRAVDA's Strelnikov who noted, according to a TASS review of the 10th, that U.S. military considerations have assisted Spain to realize, in effect, its "old dream" of membership in NATO despite continued opposition to Spanish membership by several NATO members. Strelnikov attributed the conclusion of this "dangerous deal" to Pentagon efforts to strengthen and expand "the military beachhead in the Iberian Peninsula." RED STAR on 8 August, according to TASS, said that Spain has become the only place where the Pentagon can "somehow compensate the loss of its bases first in France and then in Libya." TASS correspondent Melikyan on 7 August claimed that the agreement's establishment of a high-level joint committee on defense matters creates "a bridge between Spain and the NATO military bloc" and represents "the first step" in Pentagon designs to "strengthen the NATO rear."

Melikyan also asserts that nuclear-armed U.S. planes flying from bases in Spain will "create daily and hourly the danger of a new Palomares for the Spanish people," recalling the 17 January 1966 incident. Several other Soviet commentaries also raise the spectre of Palomares in stressing that the agreement "contradicts Spain's national security and the people's interests."

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## MITRIONE SLAYING

## HAVANA STRESSES SLAIN OFFICIAL'S TIES WITH CIA, FBI

Extensive Havana reportage and limited comment on the abduction and subsequent slaying of Dan Mitrione, U.S. police adviser to the Uruguayan Government, has emphasized his alleged links to the CIA and FBI. Havana has suggested that Washington refrained from urging Uruguay to agree to the 'Tupamaros guerrillas' demands for the release of prisoners in exchange for Mitrione because it feared his release would focus public attention on U.S. clandestine activities in Latin America. Although Havana has avoided specifically approving Mitrione's execution, it has lauded the "prudent and firm policy" followed by the Tupamaros in the Mitrione case.

Both before and after Mitrione's slaying, Havana media repeatedly characterized him as a CIA and FBI agent with a long history of counterrevolutionary activity. Thus Radio Havana on the 6th, citing political exiles in Paris as the source, reported that Mitrione had participated in the 1964 Brazilian military coup which ousted President Goulart. It noted that he was a "political-military adviser" in Brazil at that time and "cooperated" with Brazilian generals responsible for the coup, turning up "during 1962 and 1963 . . . as a CIA agent in Belo Horizonte, a city where several of the officers who cooperated in the coup resided." Other Havana comment has intimated that, because of Mitrione's connections with U.S. security organizations, Washington preferred to "sacrifice" him rather than risk exposure of U.S. clandestine activities. A Radio Havana broadcast on the 11th, citing a report by a PRENSA LATINA correspondent in Montevideo, observed that while the Tupamaros' demand for the release of all political prisoners was "too excessive to merit an all-out effort to save Mitrione's life," it was also true that he "was not indispensable to the CIA and that he had a long espionage career whose details would be best not revealed." With his release, it concluded, "many curious eyes and writers would have focused on him."

A 5 August Radio Havana commentary charged that Mitrione's kidnaping had "once more revealed U.S. interference in the internal affairs of our America." According to Radio Havana, a Uruguayan deputy who planned to request an investigation of Mitrione's activities had described him as "an official of a foreign government infiltrated into the Uruguayan security

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system." The commentary concluded by charging that "In our America there are thousands of Mitriones, thousands of U.S. police and espionage agents, who are placed, sometimes under the most innocent disguises, in the Latin America repressive corps or in trade union and student organizations in our countries." An 11 August Radio Havana report cited the Washington POST as recommending that Washington "review its programs of cooperation with the police forces of Latin American nations because they may injure sensitive feelings and give rise to cases such as Dan Mitrione's."

In articles in the Havana press last June, the Tupamaros were held up as a model to other revolutionaries in South America's southern cone, and it was alleged that the Cuban revolution had greatly influenced their "tactical concepts."\* On 1 August Havana media carried a letter from "Chato" Peredo, commander of the Bolivian National Liberation Army, extolling the collaboration between his movement and the Tupamaros. And in greeting the foreign delegations in Cuba during his 26 July speech, Castro noted that a Tupamaros delegation was en route to Cuba, "although they were not able to attend this ceremony." Monitored Havana media have said nothing further about the delegation.

## CASTRO DENIES

## KIDNAPING INVOLVEMENT

In a lengthy interview with a delegation of Chilean students and journalists on 1 August, which has been summarized by Havana media, Castro was not reported to have alluded to the Mitrione kidnaping, but in response to a general question about kidnapings of diplomats in Latin America he avowed that Cuba "never promoted kidnapings; they have occurred spontaneously." Although he said the validity of using kidnaping "as a revolutionary weapon" must be determined by the revolutionaries involved, he clearly sought to justify its employment, noting that revolutionaries resort to kidnaping "to keep their jailed comrades from murder

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\* For a discussion of these articles see the TRENDS of 1 July 1970, pages 36-38.

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and tortures." "I am not going to condemn the revolutionaries who use those means, necessitated by the situation of repression and crime reigning in those countries," he declared.

During his 22 April Lenin Day speech, Castro indicated that Latin American states could not expect Cuban cooperation in reaching agreements to curb kidnappings. Last September, when greeting 13 Brazilian revolutionaries who had been released from prison in exchange for the freedom of kidnaped U.S. Ambassador Elbrick, Castro did not attempt to conceal his approval of the kidnaping. He characterized it as a "sensational" act which was "a humiliation, a smashing blow to imperialism and its lackeys in Brazil."

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## PHILIPPINES

## PEKING HAILS REVIVAL OF ARMED STRUGGLE LED BY CPP

Peking ends a silence of almost three years on the activities of the Philippine Communist Party (CPP), with NCNA on 4 August hailing the CPP-led "New People's Army" for waging "vigorous revolutionary struggles" against the "reactionary troops of the Philippine authorities" and citing a Manila press report that "guerrilla warfare has begun." The commentary, widely rebroadcast by Radio Peking, alleges that the CPP, "since its rebuilding in December, 1968," has successfully led the New People's Army in defeating a number of Philippine Government military expeditions against it, particularly the "full-scale military operations" initiated in late May in several provinces in central Luzon. The military victories of the people's forces, the commentary says, have "thrown the reactionaries into a panic." The item includes a routine denunciation of the United States for supplying the Philippine Government with encouragement and military materiel; characteristically, it does not attack President Marcos directly.

**BACKGROUND** The current commentary is Peking's first propaganda support for the CPP since a spate of broadcasts of this nature in mid-1967, during the period of "Red Guard diplomacy." The outburst began on 21 May 1967 with NCNA transmitting a 1 May CPP Politburo statement praising Mao's thought and advocating nationwide party rebuilding, development of rural bases and armed struggle, and a national united front under the leadership of the working class. Peking's reports of alleged battle successes by the CPP-led "Philippine People's Liberation Army" in the rural areas of Luzon continued through mid-October 1967.

Since that time, Chinese comment has focused on anti-U.S. activities of the "Philippine people." For example, a 2 January 1970 NCNA review of the progress of the "Philippine people's mass movement" during 1969 cited numerous strikes and demonstrations against actions and policies of "U.S. imperialism" and its Philippine "lackeys," as well as military action against U.S. troops. Although the commentary claimed that more and more Filipinos were studying Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought "with a view to seeking revolutionary truth to guide their revolutionary practice," it made no reference to the CPP.

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Soviet media have not mentioned the alleged resurgence of armed struggle in the Philippines and do not appear to have referred to the CPP for over five years. Moscow last took note of the CPP in a 30 January 1965 domestic radio commentary which cited the CPP's position that liberation could be achieved by peaceful means and charged the Philippine Government with attempting to kindle anti-communist hysteria. Western news sources identified the CPP as one of the two unnamed "clandestine" parties present at the June 1969 Moscow conference, but Moscow said nothing about its presence. The CPP was not among the parties reported to have sent representatives to the Lenin centenary celebrations in Moscow in April. Infrequent Soviet radio commentaries on the Philippines generally focus on demonstrations against U.S. actions and policies and on alleged U.S. exploitation of the Philippine economy and domination of Philippine foreign policy.

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## YUGOSLAVIA AND ALBANIA

## TITO CALLS FOR IMPROVED TIES, PLEDGES NONINTERFERENCE

President Tito, in a 7 August speech at Zabljak reported by Radio Zagreb, seemed to go out of his way to assure Albania that Yugoslavia is ready to significantly improve state relations on the basis of noninterference. Digressing from his main topic of Montenegro's domestic affairs, Tito turned to relations with Tirana and declared: "We want good relations with Albania and we have no other interests toward Albania . . . ." He went on to recall that the Albanians and Yugoslavs "fought shoulder to shoulder" in World War II, and added that "today the international situation is such that we have much in common." In this context he said that "I think we have possibilities to cooperate successfully on the question of preserving our independence, our integrity, and noninterference in internal affairs."\* He also indicated that there are possibilities for expanding economic ties between the two countries. Although acknowledging that ideological differences remain, he underlined that they should not stand in the way of good state relations and expressed confidence that the Albanian people "will not refuse the hand which we are extending to them."

Tito's remarks appear to be responsive to a speech by Albanian party chief Hoxha, made on 30 May in Bajram Curry, as reported by ATA, in which he called for improved Yugoslav-Albanian relations and promised not to interfere in Yugoslavia's internal affairs. Hoxha also pointed to a common Yugoslav-Albanian bond, but was more explicit than Tito in relating it to shared "threats" from the Soviet Union. After charging the USSR with threatening the Balkans, he pledged that "the Albanian people will be on the side of the Yugoslav people."

Albanian and Yugoslav expressions of willingness to improve bilateral ties have been paralleled by Yugoslav-Chinese efforts to normalize state relations--a factor which may have encouraged the Albanians to conduct their relations with

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\* In his celebrated speech before the 1960 Moscow conference, Hoxha had charged the Yugoslavs with interfering in Albanian affairs since 1942 and, following the liberation, with "plotting" to invade Albania and "proclaim it a seventh republic of Yugoslavia."

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Yugoslavia in a more cooperative spirit. Belgrade's TANYUG reported from Peking on 11 August that the newly-appointed Chinese ambassador to Yugoslavia had met with his Yugoslav counterpart in apparent preparation for his departure for Belgrade. Thus the normalization of state relations with China might be a prelude to an exchange of ambassadors between Tirana and Belgrade.

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## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## NOVY MIR CONTINUES ITS SUPPORT OF LIBERAL CAUSES

Despite the crackdown on NOVY MIR last February, which radically overhauled its editorial board and led to the resignation of chief editor Aleksandr Tvardovskiy, the controversial literary journal continues to serve as a sounding board for political liberalism and economic reformism. As in the more recent past, these ideas appear mainly in the book review section of the journal rather than in its belles-lettres, and they are expressed both overtly and covertly, depending on the sensitivity of the issues involved. The expressions of political liberalism are, of course, carefully guarded, appearing under the traditional polemical guise of criticism of 19th century tsarist or contemporary Chinese institutions and practices. Economic reformism is expressed more openly, though in predominantly theoretical terms.

In continuing to provide an outlet for liberal ideas, NOVY MIR perpetuates the tradition of independence that has become its trademark in the post-Stalin period. Thus, even after the major editorial purges in 1954 and 1958, the journal withstood the pressures for conformity and maintained its integrity as an organ of independent public opinion.

REPRESSION      NOVY MIR No. 2--the first issue to appear under  
ATTACKED      the new chief editor Valeriy Kosolapov--critically  
                 examines the institution of press censorship in  
a review of a book by A.I. Stanko entitled "Russian Newspapers  
in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century." Although the  
context of the review is ostensibly historical, its topical  
implications are unmistakable. The NOVY MIR reviewer M. Volkov  
describes the struggle of "progressive circles" of Russian  
society against the "intellectual dikes" of the regime. He  
emphasizes the vital role of the literary press in this struggle  
and recalls how "writers and publicists" devised "a whole series  
of special terms and conditional concepts" to circumvent the  
censorship and conduct public discussion of the "most burning  
problems of the times." The use of such conspiratorial devices,  
he writes, confused the censors and solidified the ties binding  
writers and readers.

The issues of censorship and intellectual freedom are also  
raised in Yevgeniy Yevtushenko's poem "Kazan University," which  
appears in NOVY MIR No. 4. Although the context of the poem is

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again historical, it echoes themes that have repeatedly appeared in the contemporary underground (samizdat) press. Among the prominent themes in the poem are the need for intellectual freedom in the sciences, for safeguards against arbitrary and illegal actions, and for free discussion of public issues. In the conclusion of his poem, Yevtushenko even foresees the emergency of "future Ulyanovs" in the struggle for Russian freedom.

Another appeal of the contemporary Soviet underground--for publicity in matters of state policy--appears in a review by M. Volkov of two recent Soviet works on China under Mao (NOVY MIR No. 3). Volkov asserts that Lenin considered "publicity" to be an "important condition" for the "proper functioning" of the socialist state--a "condition" that has been increasingly observed in the breach by the Soviet regime in recent years. Instead of calling attention to this gap, however, Volkov judiciously points to the situation in China where "the most important questions of state and party policy are decided in closed meetings about which the people are actually not informed."

In another provocative gesture, Volkov calls attention to the 20th party congress, which has been generally ignored by the Soviet leaders in recent years. He observes that in the mid-1950's the political orientation of a Chinese leader could be accurately gauged by his attitude toward the 20th congress. And he compares the equivocal position of Mao toward the congress and the struggle against the Stalin cult with that of other Chinese leaders who regarded the congress as a "most important political event."

The question of Russian interventionism in Eastern Europe is pointedly raised in a review by D. Aleksandrov in NOVY MIR No. 5, of Ye. B. Chernyak's "Gendarmes of History (Counter-revolutionary Interventions and Plots)." The book, which surveys the policies of the great powers in world politics since the 16th century, is sharply criticized for certain "omissions" regarding the role of Russia as the "gendarme of Europe" in the 19th century. Aleksandrov recalls that Lenin "disclosed the organic connection of [Russian] interventionism and shameless reaction in internal policy," and he goes on to berate the author for failing to examine the impact of the reactionary interventions on the "progressive social strata in the countries undertaking the invasions." In Aleksandrov's

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view, the tsarist interventions in Poland and Hungary led to the emergence of "a more consistent and purposeful struggle against interventionism and other manifestations of political obscurantism."

ECONOMIC           The struggle against economic conservatism also  
REFORMISM       continues to be waged in NOVY MIR in the form of  
                  book reviews defending the principles of the  
1965 economic reform and exposing its diehard opponents. A  
book about Lenin's economic ideas by one such opponent,  
N.V. Khessin, is critically reviewed in NOVY MIR No. 3 by the  
outspoken economic reformist Gennadiy Lisichkin. Lisichkin  
counters the author's allegations that the current "enthusiasm"  
for the market, profits, and profitability is anti-Marxist by  
invoking the authority of Lenin. He cites Lenin's works  
during the NEP and charges that the author, like other  
conservative diehards, ignores these views and concentrates  
instead on Lenin's earlier works, particularly during the  
period of war communism. By so doing, Lisichkin argues, the  
author distorts Lenin's ideas on the relationship between the  
plan and the market under socialism.

A similar, though less outspoken, line of argumentation is  
followed in A. Volkov's review of a recently published  
collection of Lenin's works on labor productivity (NOVY MIR  
No. 5). Volkov criticized the editors of the collection  
for failing to include materials documenting Lenin's concern  
for profitability, trade, and the market under socialism.  
The materials in question turn out to be Lenin's speeches  
and writings during the NEP, especially his statements at the  
11th party congress (March-April 1922).

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## PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## SHANGHAI EXERCISES CONTROL OVER ITS RUSTICATED YOUTH

The Anhwei provincial radio on 29 July furnished some details on the continuing role played by the Shanghai authorities in the lives of Shanghai youth sent to other provinces. Shanghai has frequently told of the "comfort teams" sent to visit the rusticated young people, but without indicating that such teams possessed any real power. Anhwei now reports that the teams--resident in Anhwei, Inner Mongolia, Kirin, Kweichow, Liaoning, and Yunnan--are composed of government cadres who "assist" local party organizations and revolutionary committees "at all levels" in working with the educated youth.

The Anhwei broadcast also reports that all the scattered comfort teams were represented at a July meeting in Hofei, called by the Shanghai MRC to "coordinate experiences." The broadcast notes that "leading comrades" of the Anhwei PRC as well as of the Shanghai office in charge of educated youth spoke at the meeting; but overall the report points up the power of Shanghai, which appears to have opened up lines of authority far outside the borders of the municipality. The practical aim of the movement is probably genuine enough, however, with alienated youth and their parents in Shanghai deriving a measure of solace from the belief that the students are not forgotten by the Shanghai authorities and may one day return to the factory or even the university.

## ANHWEI UNIVERSITIES REOPEN, FOLLOWING PEKING'S LEAD

On 9 August the Anhwei provincial radio announced that six provincial universities began accepting students this month. The schools include Anhwei University as well as labor, agricultural, and industrial colleges. Anhwei is the first province to announce the reopening of universities following the special RED FLAG issue on education last month, which included details of the reopening of Tsinghua University in Peking.

The Anhwei universities follow the general path set by Tsinghua in teaching "cultural and scientific theory as well as practical experience." The period of schooling will depend on the course of study, but "will generally be

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from one to three years," although short-term classes will also be given. Except for a limited number of workers and peasants "with rich practical experience," who will probably be assigned to the short-term courses, students must meet quality requirements. Their education must at least equal the junior middle school level, and they must have two years of practical experience and be about 20 years old. To insure "outstanding students," the "masses" will make initial recommendations, which will then be subject to examination and approval by the leadership. The article does not indicate that the schools will be closely tied to factories, nor does it indicate that workers will have a large hand in the management of universities.

#### REBUILDING OF YCL URGED BY HUPEH DAILY EDITORIAL

A 7 August HUPEH DAILY editorial made an unusually strong call for rebuilding and revitalizing the Young Communist League (YCL), even stating that overaged members should be encouraged to leave. Previously there had been little indication that age was of concern, and there had even been one plea that overaged YCL members stay in the organization and not use their age to escape responsibilities.

The Hupeh editorial stresses that YCL rectification must be carried out separately from the more general party-building campaign, and it calls on party organs at all levels to put YCL work "on the party's daily agenda," with no more delays by units waiting for examples or specific orders. In places "where party rectification has mainly been done well," YCL organs which have reached a sufficient stage of ideological rectification "must revive the organizational life of the YCL." The qualifications for new members were not specified, beyond the injunction that they must be "progressive youths."

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